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A UNIVERSAL SOLUTION TO THE MINORITY
HOUSING PROBLEM*
CHESTER HARTMAN**
Although health care, welfare reform, and the economy have cap-
tured the lion's share of attention at the outset of the Clinton era, hous-
ing ought to be an equally critical issue. But it is not. Relatively little
was said about housing during the 1992 election campaign, and it is note-
worthy that Mandate for Change, the intellectual-political "marching or-
ders" produced by the Progressive Policy Institute, the think-tank of
Democratic Leadership Council, did not include housing among its four-
teen chapters.'
Undeniably, the nation's housing problems are severe and are deteri-
orating for all racial groups and for middle- and lower-income house-
holds; still, the most alarming problems afflict poor racial minorities.
The housing crisis ranges from the inability of middle-income households
to afford to buy homes or to keep their homes to the obscenity of outright
homelessness for up to three million Americans.2
I. THE NATURE OF THE HOUSING CRISIS
A November 1992 report from the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, based on the Census Bureau's most recently published Ameri-
can Housing Survey,3 documents the severity of housing problems faced
by black' and Hispanic households, particularly poor households in these
* Copyright @ 1993 by Chester Hartman.
** President/Executive Director of the Poverty and Race Research Action Council in
Washington, D.C.; A.B., Ph.D., Harvard University.
1. PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE, MANDATE FOR CHANGE (Will Marshall & Martin
Schram eds., 1993). The "blueprint" contains discrete chapters on many domestic issues:
health care, family policy, citizen safety, welfare, environmental degradation, education, and
"enterprise economics."
2. Estimates of the homeless are used, because hard data are impossible to generate. No
one disputes, however, that the numbers are rising and that employed persons and households
with children are found in increasing numbers among shelter residents.
3. PAUL A. LEONARD & EDWARD B. LAZERE, CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORI-
TIES, Low INCOME HOUSING CRISIS IN 44 MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS xi (1992). The
metropolitan area surveys are conducted on a rolling triennial basis; the most recent published
data range from 1986 to 1989. Id. at 1. The report defines "poor households" as those whose
total household income is below the poverty line for households of that size. See JOINT
CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE NATION'S
HOUSING 17-22 (1992).
4. Editor's Note: The contributors to this symposium have used the terms "African
1558 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
racial groups. "In the typical large metro area," the report notes, "22
percent of poor black households and 25 percent of poor Hispanic house-
holds lived in deficient housing, while eight percent of poor white house-
holds did." 5
American," "black," and "black American," often interchangeably, in their articles. The
North Carolina Law Review has elected to defer to its contributors' choices in the absence of
any universally accepted racial or ethnic designation.
5. LEONARD & LAZERE, supra note 3, at xvi. "Deficient housing" is a classification used
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in its American Housing Survey.
Id. at 26. It consists of units with "severe" and "moderate" physical problems. Id. In the
former category are units with one or more of the following deficiencies:
* The unit lacks hot or cold water or a flush toilet, or both a bathtub and a shower;
* The unit's heating equipment has broken down at least three times for periods of
six hours or more during the previous winter, resulting in the unit being uncom-
fortably cold for 24 hours or more;
* The unit has no electricity, or the unit has exposed wiring and has a room with no
working wall outlet and has three blown fuses or tripped circuit breakers during
the previous 90 days;
* The unit has, in public areas such as hallways and staircases, no working light
fixtures and loose or missing steps and loose or missing railings and no elevator;
* The unit has at least five basic maintenance problems such as water leaks, holes in
the floors or ceilings, peeling paint or broken plaster, or evidence of rats during the
previous 90 days.
Id.
In the latter category are units that have none of the above deficiencies, but have one or
more of the following defects:
" On at least three occasions in the past three months, all flush toilets in the unit
were broken for at least six hours;
* The unit has unvented gas, oil, or kerosene heaters as its primary heating
equipment;
* The unit lacks a sink, refrigerator, or either burners or an oven;
* The unit has three of the four hallway or staircase problems listed above;
" The unit has at least three of the basic maintenance problems listed above.
Id.
The quality, reliability, and conceptual underpinnings of Census Bureau-HUD housing
quality data long have been debated and criticized. A relatively unheeded critique of the data
included in an important background report prepared for the National Commission on Urban
Problems (the "Douglas Commission") contained this disturbing caveat:
[I]t is readily apparent that even the most conscientious user of Census data...
would arrive at a total "substandard" ["deficient," using the more recent federal no-
menclature] housing figure which grossly underestimated the number of dwelling
units having serious housing code violations. To use a total thus arrived at as a figure
for substandard housing is grossly inaccurate and misleading, because it flies in the
face of extensive consideration given by health experts, building officials, model code
drafting organizations, and the local, state and Federal court system to what have
become [sic] over a period of many years, the socially, politically and legally accepted
minimum standard for housing of human beings in the United States.
Oscar Sutermeister, Inadequacies and Inconsistencies in the Definition of Substandard Housing,
in HOUSING CODE STANDARDS: THREE CRITICAL STUDIES 78, 83 (1969). The report later
states that "even if public and private efforts eliminate all housing which is substandard under
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Overcrowding, defined as more than one person per room, is also
rampant, as poor families try to cope with the burden of staggering rental
rates by leasing less space. The problem, which is a hazard to health and
a creator of family tensions, and of poor study environments for school-
children, is particularly severe among Hispanics. "In the typical large
metro area," according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
report, "25 percent of poor Hispanic households lived in overcrowded
conditions[,]... nearly triple the typical proportion of poor black house-
holds living in overcrowded housing and more than six times the typical
proportion of poor white households in such conditions."" The degree of
overcrowding is notorious: In some metropolitan areas more than forty
percent of poor Hispanic households suffer from overcrowding.
Although poor physical conditions and overcrowding are prevalent
components of the current housing crisis, the leading defect of the U.S.
housing system for low-income households is that an overwhelming por-
tion of family income must be spent just to have a roof over one's head-
no matter how small or defective that roof may be. Approximately
three-fifths of poor households in the typical large metropolitan area, in-
cluding both renters and homeowners, devote at least half of their in-
come to housing costs.' During the four years following the 1989
American Housing Survey, the nation's housing affordability problems
undoubtedly have worsened: poverty levels have increased, family in-
comes have declined, and housing costs have either risen or remained at
a constant level.
There is no consensus as to what percentage of income families
should spend on housing.9 The extant standard under federal housing
programs-the percentage above which subsidies kick in for households
fortunate enough to be served under one of the federal housing subsidy
programs-is thirty percent. 10 Until 1981 that standard was twenty-five
percent, but it was raised after President Reagan was elected in order to
most current federal definitions, there will still be millions of dwelling units below code stan-
dard." Id. at 102.
6. LEONARD & LAZERE, supra note 3, at xvi.
7. Id. at xii-xiii. This figure includes whites as well as blacks and Hispanics. Id. But
because significantly higher rates of physical deficiencies exist in the housing of black and
Hispanic families, see supra text accompanying note 5, in addition to the largely undocu-
mented but obvious neighborhood deficiencies in minority areas, the minority's housing dollar
buys far less than the white's housing dollar.
8. Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk, A 20-Year Glitch in America, WASH. POST,
Jan. 5, 1993, at A15.
9. For a general discussion of the affordability issue and shifting standards, see Chester
Hartman, Affordability of Housing, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING AND THE BUILT ENVIRON-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES 111-29 (Elizabeth Huttman & Willem van Vliet eds., 1988).
10. Various adjustments of the base income to account for expenses, such as excessive
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reduce the amount of federal subsidy required.11 A more stringent and
realistic approach, known as the "shelter poverty" or "market basket"
approach, suggests that such fixed standards should not be used at all.
Instead, the percentage of income devoted to housing should be a func-
tion of household income and size, with lower income and larger families
being required to pay lower, and in some cases far lower, percentages for
housing. This lower percentage would be based on their needs for other
basics, such as food, clothing, transportation, and medical care, which
cost proportionately more for large households and very poor
households.
Michael Stone, in his seminal research on shelter poverty, 2 employs
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' detailed model budgets13 to derive
what households of various sizes need for non-shelter basics. He then
computes what is left over for housing if all such basics, as estimated by
the federal government, are to be met. Not surprisingly, Stone's calcula-
tions reveal that vast numbers of households in the United States cannot
"afford" thirty percent, twenty-five percent, or even ten percent of their
income for housing. In fact, some fourteen million U.S. households can-
not afford a single penny for housing if they are to meet these non-shelter
basic costs. Nor is it surprising that racial disparities in shelter poverty
are severe: Approximately one-quarter of all white households are shel-
ter poor-that is, they cannot afford non-shelter basics because of high
housing costs--compared with one-half of all Hispanic and one-half of
all black households.
The implications of the shelter poverty concept and the figures gen-
erated by this approach are enormous, and undoubtedly they account for
the neglect of the housing crisis noted at the outset of this Essay. Stone
calculates that in order to cover the gap between housing costs and in-
comes-a fundamental structural gap inherent in the current United
States economy and housing system-some $92 billion would be required
annually. 14
childcare, medical costs, or dependent children, can yield a slightly lower true percentage of
total income.
11. For a discussion of this history, see Chester Hartman, Housing Policies Under the
Reagan Administration, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 362, 362-76 (Rachel G.
Bratt et al. eds., 1986).
12. See MICHAEL E. STONE, SHELTER POVERTY: NEW IDEAS ON HOUSING AF-
FORDABILITY (1993); MICHAEL E. STONE, ECONOMIC POLICY INST., ONE THIRD OF A NA-
TION: A NEW LOOK AT HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN AMERICA (1990) [hereinafter A NEW
LOOK].
13. A NEW LOOK, supra note 12, at 51. The government stopped publishing these figures
in 1981 with the onset of the Reagan Administration, but Stone has updated them using pub-
lished BLS data on annual consumer price changes.
14. Id. at 15. The $92 billion figure was calculated in 1987 dollars. A related study esti-
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When comparing the nation's health crisis with the nation's housing
crisis, it is important to recognize that for lower-income families, the
staggering and out-of-control health costs are borne largely by the gov-
ernment under the Medicaid and Medicare programs. The housing costs
of lower-income Americans, however, are borne primarily by the house-
holds themselves. Nearly two-thirds of poor renters do not receive a rent
subsidy under any federal, state, or local program, nor do they live in
public housing; virtually no poor homeowners receive any direct govern-
ment housing subsidies. The vast majority of the nation's poor pay their
housing costs solely out of the family's budget. 5
In other words, solving the nation's housing problem-attaining the
National Housing Goal of "a decent [affordable]16 home and suitable liv-
ing environment for every American family"I--would require more
government subsidies than anyone in government is willing to acknowl-
edge or consider.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A REAL SOLUTION
Costs aside, a serious effort to attain the National Housing Goal by
some future date (say, the year 2000) would have to address profound
social and political issues. A disproportionate number of people needing
housing aid are minorities. Whatever programs are devised consequently
mates that the cost to provide all U.S. households with an entitlement Section 8 housing
voucher to cover actual housing expenses above 30% of family income would be $17-18 billion
annually. This lower figure does not factor in inflation in market rents that would occur if
universal subsidies were introduced absent accompanying strict market controls. See BARRY
ZIGAS, A PROGRAM TO END THE Low INCOME HOUSING CRISIS (1992). The figure cited was
based on 1987 HUD testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Housing. Six years later
the figure would be considerably higher, not only because of inflation, but also due to the likely
increase in housing affordability problems.
15. The average consumer unit in the lowest 20% income percentile spent $3330 in 1988
on shelter (including fuel and utilities, but not household operations and furnishings or house-
keeping supplies) and $831 for health care. See ECONOMICS & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 446-47 (1991).
16. Congress did not cite affordability as a goal, largely because in 1949 the prevailing
issues were slum clearance (the 1949 Act introduced the urban renewal program) and increas-
ing the stock of decent low-cost housing (the same legislation authorized 810,000 units of
public housing over six years). Out-of-reach rents in the private sector were not a concern at
that time. Obviously, however, a National Housing Goal is not terribly meaningful if the cost
of obtaining housing leaves a family unable either to afford life's other basics or to achieve a
minimum decent standard of living. The issue of a "suitable living environment" has never
been defined or even considered. Were we to attempt to achieve truly decent, safe neighbor-
hoods and communities, the figures that refer solely to housing costs would have to be in-
creased greatly.
17. The goal was promulgated by Congress in its preamble to the 1949 Housing Act ch.
338, 63 Stat. 413 (1949), and then reiterated in the 1968 Housing and Urban Development
Act, P.L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968).
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would provide disproportionate benefits to such groups.1 8 And since
housing is a special social good that involves location and the various
implications of location, profound social policy issues would have to be
met head-on.
A major schism within the civil rights community exists between
proponents of dispersion remedies and proponents of "in place" reme-
dies.19 Advocates of dispersion remedies favor using housing vouchers or
certificates to allow minority inner-city residents to move in order to im-
prove their housing conditions, achieve affordable rents (defined by the
thirty percent of income standard), and attain the community-wide bene-
fits of noninner-city locations. These benefits include improved schools,
better access to jobs, less neighborhood crime, less concentration of fami-
lies with a range of social problems, and greater racial and class heteroge-
neity. An impressive body of evidence exists from the "Gautreaux
experiment"20 that indicates that use of housing vouchers or certificates
in this fashion can have positive results, particularly with respect to in-
creasing employment rates, parent satisfaction, and social integration.
Many questions arise, however, even among supporters of the program:
How much "creaming" exists in selection of beneficiaries? In other
words, are only those most likely to "succeed" selected, making the pro-
gram of only limited applicability to central-city minority households?
How much available and appropriate housing (considering size, cost, and
location) exists for use by certificate or voucher holders? What is the
possible inflationary impact of this added demand on the local housing
market? Will access to jobs raise people out of poverty if wages are so
low as to produce below-poverty incomes? Can the necessary counselling
and support services available under the Gautreaux program be repli-
18. A useful summary of the targeting versus universal strategies debate can be found in
Theda Skoepol, Targeting within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in
the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411, 412-14 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E.
Peterson eds., 1991), and Robert Greenstein, Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving
Poverty: An Alternative View, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra, at 437, 437-58.
19. For a statement of in-place position, see John Calmore, To Make Wrong Right: The
Necessary and Proper Aspirations of Fair Housing, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA, at 77
(Janet Dewart ed., 1989); a good statement of the dispersionist position may be found in Don-
ald L. DeMarco & George C. Galster, Pro-Integrative Policy: Theory and Practice, J. URBAN
AFFAIRS (forthcoming 1993).
20. This refers to a complex and lengthy lawsuit, originating in 1966, that alleged racial
discrimination in tenant selection and assignment of Chicago's public housing and led to a
pilot program making a large number of Section 8 housing subsidies available to the city's
public housing residents and those on public housing waiting lists. Detailed follow-up studies
have been undertaken by researchers at Northwestern University. See JAMES ROSENBAUM &
SUSAN POPKIN, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF HOUSING INTEGRATION (1990); Guy
Gugliotta, Lottery Offers Chicago's Black Welfare Families a Ticket Out of Town, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 24, 1993, at A3.
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cated on a broad scale? Will an influx of central city minority house-
holds trigger "white flight" or even flight of higher-income minority
households?
Those who advocate "in place" remedies, or, as it often has been
labeled, "gilding the ghetto," express resentment that dispersion pro-
grams send the message that only by breaking up inner-city neighbor-
hoods can minority households improve their lot. Why not, they ask,
provide a real choice by creating improved education, community facili-
ties, housing conditions, and neighborhood environments where people
currently live? A single mother living in Chicago's Robert Taylor
Homes, offered the opportunity to escape with a "Gautreaux ticket,"
would be crazy not to take it. But she should have the option, say the "in
placers," of an improved neighborhood without having to give up ex-
isting friendships and family and community ties, via substantial invest-
ment and creative programs tied to her own neighborhood.21 At this
time, existing studies largely support the dispersionists' approach, due to
the well-designed and publicized research in Chicago and Cincinnati.22
In order to provide a profitable comparison, it would be important to
assemble similar data concerning employment, schooling, safety, and sat-
isfaction regarding local attempts to improve housing and neighborhood
conditions in the inner city.
In reality, both strategies are necessary to solve the nation's housing
and neighborhood problems. The real question is how the two strategies
should be combined, an issue involving resource allocation decisions, na-
tional and community politics, expressed preferences, and housing mar-
ket and neighborhood realities.
III. THE MAJOR Low-INCOME HOUSING PROGRAMS
The principal low-income housing programs have been public hous-
ing and the Section 8 vouchers or certificates. The public housing pro-
gram has taken a considerable public relations beating in recent years, to
an extent because of valid criticisms, but also due to exaggerations, dis-
tortions, and unwarranted implications put forth by those ideologically
opposed to substitution of government programs for the free market. It
would be foolish to deny that a substantial part of the public housing
stock is in deep trouble, in no small part due to faulty program design,
defective local administration, and intentional subversion by hostile fed-
21. See Calmore, supra note 19, at 77.
22. PAUL FISHER, IS HOUSING MOBILITY AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-POVERTY STRATEGY?
AN EXAMINATION OF THE CINCINNATI EXPERIENCE (A Report to the Steven H. Wilder
Foundation) (1991).
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eral administrations. But it would be equally foolish to ignore the con-
siderable success of this approach. Public housing options are frequently
superior to private market alternatives in cost, physical conditions, and
management practices, as evidenced by the sound shape of most of the
nation's 1.3 million public housing units, residents' satisfaction with their
conditions, and the long waiting lists at even the most troubled housing
authorities.23
The notion of extensive government subsidies to create, via con-
struction, rehabilitation, or purchase of existing buildings, housing spe-
cifically for families the market does not serve is sound.24 As will be seen
below, government subsidies can and must form the core of a serious
approach to attain the National Housing Goal within a decade, so long
as we also learn well the lessons of why some parts of the public housing
program have failed. The architectural, siting, locational, and social mis-
takes embodied in much big-city public housing must not be replicated.
Operating subsidies must be sufficient. Adequate maintenance and mod-
ernization funds must be provided. More responsive and competent
management, including, where possible and appropriate, tenant self-man-
agement, must exist. More emphasis must be placed on mixed-use and
mixed-income developments. The full range of needed supportive serv-
ices must be as much a part of housing programs as the bricks and
mortar.
The second major, and newer, government approach to providing
housing subsidies for low-income households is Section 8 rent subsidies,
which allow families to live in privately owned units. The advantages of
this approach, in the certificate or voucher form, are flexibility, economy
(in other words, ability to take advantage of slack in the existing housing
stock), maximization of individual choice, and portability. But this pro-
gram has its limitations as well, and these were clearly revealed in the
Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP), one of the largest
social science experiments ever undertaken in this country. EHAP in-
23. For an overall evaluation of the accomplishments and defects of the public housing
program, see Rachel G. Bratt, Public Housing: The Controversy and the Contribution, in CRIT-
ICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING, supra note 11, at 335. A National Association of Housing
and Redevelopment Officials survey reported a nationwide aggregate of 1.1 million households
on local housing authorities' waiting lists (in addition to 1.2 million households on waiting lists
for subsidized privately owned housing). See LEONARD & LAZERE, supra note 3, at xviii-xix.
A more general evaluation of the full range of federal housing programs may be found in
Chester Hartman & Barry Zigas, What Is Wrong With Our Housing Programs, in HOMELESS
CHILDREN AND YOUTH: A NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 197 (Julee H. Kryder-Coe et al. eds.,
1991).
24. This housing would be owned and managed on a nonprofit basis, under arrangements




volved giving housing allowances to 30,000 households over a period of
years and under a variety of conditions in order to test demand effects,
supply effects, and administrative variations. The experiment results
showed that when certificates were available to all who met eligibility
criteria, less than half of all eligible households used them; that participa-
tion rates were lowest for minority, poor, and large households and those
living in poor-quality dwellings; that participation rates rose sharply
when (as in some of the sub-experiments) no housing quality standard
had to be met-that is, when recipients could rent substandard quarters,
which actually occurred in about two-thirds of the cases; and that partic-
ipation triggered little geographic mobility by recipients and resulted in
few housing repairs by landlords.25
Although housing allowances are not a panacea, under certain con-
ditions-when there is market slack and when the program is accompa-
nied by effective quality and rent controls-they can be an important
component of the government's overall housing program.
IV. NEEDED: A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM
The disproportionately severe housing problems of minorities must
and should be solved as an integral part of a general solution to the na-
tion's housing problems. And a serious program to attain the National
Housing Goal within a decade necessarily will involve a mixture of both
dominant past approaches: (1) creating permanently affordable housing
and (2) providing subsidies for families to move to or continue living in
decent existing units.
What might the first approach-a revised "public housing" pro-
gram-look like?26 There are three key elements of such an approach:
(1) Structural changes in the financing of housing in order to mini-
mize the amount of government subsidies needed and to provide the basis
for the assurance of permanent affordability.
25. See Do HOUSING ALLOWANCES WORK? (Katharine L. Bradbury & Anthony Downs
eds., 1981) (presenting the findings and implications of the EHAP at a conference held by
HUD at the Brookings Institution in November 1979); HOUSING VOUCHERS FOR THE POOR:
LESSONS FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT (Raymond J. Struyk & Marc Bendick, Jr. eds.,
1981) (analyzing the design, operation, findings, and policy implications of the EHAP);
Chester Hartman, Housing Allowances: A CriticalLook, 5 J. URB. AFF. 41, 41-55 (1983) (con-
cluding that EHAP is an ineffective housing program); Chester Hartman, Rejoinder to "An-
other Look at Housing Allowances," 5 J. URB. AFF. 159 (1983) (responding to author Philip
Abrams's defense of housing allowance due programs in Abrams's article, Another Look at
Housing Allowances: A Response to Chester Hartman, 5 J. URB. AFF. 151 (1983)).
26. Elements of the program description that follows are based on INSTITUTE FOR POL-
ICY STUDIES WORKING GROUP ON HOUSING: THE RIGHT TO HOUSING: A BLUEPRINT FOR
HOUSING THE NATION 24-60 (1989) [hereinafter INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES].
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(2) Assuring an ownership and subsidy structure that guarantees
permanent affordability for those who cannot afford the going market
costs of housing.
(3) A commitment to provide sufficient government subsidies to
close the gap between income and housing costs, as long as there are
people with incomes insufficient to meet existing market costs of housing.
Let us examine these elements in detail.
A. Structural changes in the financing of housing in order to minimize
the amount of government subsidies needed and to provide the basis
for the assurance of permanent affordability
The key factor of housing costs in our economy is the cost of the
capital needed to construct or purchase the dwelling-a capital good
with a value usually several times the annual income of the occupants.
Almost invariably, credit is used, and the cumulative cost of repaying the
principal, with interest, typically is several times the actual amount of the
capital borrowed. For the consumer with a mortgage debt, the cost of
servicing that loan in most cases overwhelms the sum of all other housing
costs. For example, data from th6 1990 Housing Census shows that the
median monthly housing cost for owner-occupied units bearing a mort-
gage was $737, while the comparable figure for owner-occupied units
without mortgage indebtedness was only $209.27 For a tenant, the pro-
portion of rent payments similarly routed, albeit indirectly, to the lender
will vary with the landlord's actual financing situation. Use of second,
and even third, mortgages by building owners to extract cash from
properties rapidly and frequently can raise the percentage for renters
higher than for the average homeowner.
An essential element of a strategy to reduce housing costs and keep
government subsidies to a minimum will therefore logically aim at the
element of housing costs that dwarfs all others. Were housing to be
treated as social infrastructure, we might socialize the provision of capi-
tal and require users to pay only the ongoing costs of occupancy: utili-
ties, property taxes, insurance, maintenance, and repairs. A fundamental
restructuring of the housing finance system would reduce housing costs
for the average consumer by more than two-thirds in some cases, thereby
making housing more affordable for a vast portion of the present popula-
tion experiencing housing problems.
This government-provided capital could be raised either through the
27. 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Social, Economic, and Housing
Characteristics, 375 at Table 8 (Nov. 1992) (available from U.S. Gov't Printing Office). Non-
mortgage costs include real estate taxes, fire, hazard and flood insurance, utilities, and fuels.
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tax system or by government borrowing, but in either case there would
be a one-time payment of the capital costs (up front in the former case,
over the life of the bonds in the latter case), rather than the present sys-
tem of reborrowing and refinancing each time a house is sold, incurring
new and usually higher debt, so that monthly debt-service costs in effect
become a permanent occupancy cost.
B. Assuring an ownership and subsidy structure that guarantees
permanent affordability for those who cannot afford the going
market costs of housing
A massive structural change in the housing finance system would
necessitate changes in the traditional concept and workings of "home
ownership": specifically, housing financed under this reformed system
would not be bought and sold under existing market arrangements. No
individual would own housing in the traditional sense of being able to sell
it for profit. "Ownership" of housing would be a multi-layered concept.
Essentially, it boils down to three somewhat distinct attributes: The
right to sell for whatever the market will bear, security of tenure, and the
right to alter living space to suit one's needs and preferences. These last
two attributes arguably are more important to resident satisfaction and
community stability than the economic rights inherent in traditional
forms of housing ownership.2" Under a system of social provision of cap-
ital, both security of tenure and the right to modify one's living space
would survive and, in fact, be enhanced. With substantially lower
monthly costs, the huge number of households evicted for nonpayment
28. Extensive studies of Boston's West End, bulldozed away in the late 1950s under the
urban renewal program, showed dramatically how residents, under tenancy conditions charac-
terized by low rents and ostensible total security of tenure, behaved like homeowners. Dura-
tion of residence in the neighborhood was extraordinarily long, and, until the onset of the
urban renewal program, the prevailing attitude was that people could remain as long as they
wished in their small tenement buildings, which in many cases were owned by neighbors, rela-
tives, or former neighbors, the vast majority of whom were first- and second-generation Italian
Americans. One consequence of these conditions was a very high degree of the same kind of
investment of family funds and self-help labor in apartment improvements that one normally
associates only with homeowners. See HERBERT J. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS (1982)
(reporting study and observation of the West End neighborhood from October 1957 to May
1958); Marc Fried, Grievingfor a Lost Home, in THE URBAN CONDITION 151, 169 (Leonard J.
Duhl ed., 1963) (concluding that spatial and group identity were the "critical foci of the sense
of community" for those relocated from the West End and arguing that lessons from the West
End can be used to "create a housing system that retains and strengthens the noneconomic
value of traditional home ownership while eliminating the economic dimension"); Chester
Hartman, Homeownership: Who's Got to Have It, CITY LIMITs, May 1990, at 19-20; Chester
Hartman, Social Values and Housing Orientations, 19 J. Soc. IssuEs 113 (1963) (studying
effects on mental health of forced relocation from the West End and suggesting alternative
considerations for conceptions of slums).
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of rent or mortgage foreclosure would be reduced considerably.29 The
ability to live in decent housing for one-half to one-third of present costs,
plus the greater security of tenure, would, for most lower-income people,
substantially outweigh the speculative value of being able to reap a capi-
tal gain from the possibly increased value of one's house when selling it-
one of the traditional attractions of conventional homeownership.30
Housing financed in this manner therefore would be owned by non-
profit social entities, within or independent from government. The "pub-
lie housing" built under this drastically reformed subsidy system would
be developed and owned by a range of nonprofit organizations: govern-
ment agencies, neighborhood groups, tenant cooperatives, community
development corporations, community land trusts, and religious and la-
bor organizations. A more appropriate label would be "social housing,"
a term and concept widely used in Europe. The motivation for such
groups to involve themselves in housing development and management
would be to provide the best housing, with supportive community facili-
ties and social services, at the lowest cost to the consumer; the motiva-
tion would not be, as under the dominant present system, profit
maximization by all the key actors: lenders, land speculators, developers,
realtors, landlords, and property managers. Such a system also repre-
sents the most efficient use of government tax dollars. The dominant
current federal low-income housing program, Section 8, provides virtu-
ally no controls over the cost elements of private financing, ownership,
and management, and it merely throws into this uncontrolled market as
many dollars per unit as are needed to close the gap between what a
recipient can afford and what the market is charging for that unit.31 The
defects so often associated with bureaucracies like local housing authori-
29. Nearly five percent of all home mortgages in the United States are past due, that is, 30
or 60 days behind in payment. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am., National Delinquency Sur-
vey, 3rd quarter 1992 (Washington, D.C.). No national data are available on tenant evictions,
which are carried out by state and local courts. Moreover, definitional problems are involved:
Is a tenant evicted only when a court order is enforced? Or is it more meaningful to describe
eviction as a "voluntary" moveout in response to a court order and before the sheriff or mar-
shall arrives to enforce the order? Or is an eviction a moveout in response to the landlord's
notice to vacate, absent any court proceedings or official communication? Depending on what
definition is used, most experts estimate the annual number of evictions to be in at least the six-
figure range and possibly well into the millions.
30. For a comparison of the implications for household economics of the present mort-
gage system with the system described here (resident-savers), see Chester Hartman & Michael
E. Stone, A Socialist Housing Alternative for the United States, in CRITICAL PERSPEcTIVES ON
HOUSING, supra note 11, at 494.
31. HUD does establish Fair Market Rents ("FMRs") for each local housing market and
will not provide Section 8 subsidies above that level. But these FMRs are established, and
periodically updated, based on the realities of the local housing market and thus are designed
to avoid paying more than prevailing market prices. They do nothing to lower or control
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ties largely would be avoided, because these community-based entities
would be directly responsible and accountable to the residents and com-
munities in which they operate.
Even with the extraordinarily expensive subsidy that the govern-
ment "gift" of capital costs requires, there nevertheless will be families
with incomes too low to afford ongoing operating costs and to have suffi-
cient income for non-shelter basics. Further subsidies, therefore, will be
needed for such persons, in the form of operating funds to be paid to the
owner or manager, or rent vouchers or certificates to be used by the resi-
dent.32 These supplementary funds must be available for however long
they are needed.
In addition to programs creating additional units of affordable hous-
ing, programs are needed to remedy unacceptable conditions prevalent in
many public housing units, such as overcrowding, physical deterioration,
or unaffordability. Three additional elements, therefbre, would be
needed:
(a) Conversion of privately owned subsidized units to permanently
affordable nonprofit status. Some 350,000 low- to moderate-income
rental units, built under various federal mortgage subsidy programs, are
owned privately (by for-profit as well as non-profit entities), and after
twenty years the owners can opt out of the subsidy arrangements and
disengage from any restrictions on rent levels or occupancy.33 Many
owners are in the process of or are planning to do just that, and a subsidy
program is needed to retain these units in the affordable housing stock
and avert massive displacement.
(b) Giving low- and moderate-income homeowners the option of
converting their residences to social ownership (through a social housing
market costs; in fact, if a large amount of Section 8 subsidy funding is introduced into a hous-
ing market, this will cause inflation and, consequently, an increase in the FMR.
32. In the current public housing program, capital costs similarly are excluded from the
local housing authority's operating budget, and there is no need for tenant rents to cover re-
payment of these costs. Most commonly, local housing authorities issue long-term tax-exempt
bonds and then enter into an annual contributions contract with the federal government which
calls for annual federal payments equal to the costs of servicing those bonds; more recently, for
the trickle of new public housing still being built, the federal government has been using the
cheaper method of supplying a capital grant up front. Yet the poverty of public housing ten-
ants and the increasing cost of maintaining public housing have created a severe gap between
what it costs to operate public housing and the income generated by tenants' rents, which are
set, as noted above, at 30% of income. A variety of supplementary federal subsidies have been
introduced to cover this shortfall, and tenant rents in many large cities cover only about half of
the actual operating costs. This shortfall illustrates the inadequacy of capital cost subsidies
alone to make housing affordable, absent additional subsidies.
33. See EMILY AcHTENBERG, PRESERVING EXPIRING USE RESTRICTION PROJECTS
(1992).
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entity) and simultaneously being relieved of debt obligations. Homeown-
ers virtually are shut out from existing government subsidy programs
(save those who can take advantage of the homeowner deduction of
mortgage interest and property tax payments from their taxable income).
A great many, however, are living in substandard conditions and/or pay-
ing unaffordable homeownership costs. Many of these homeowners are
losing their homes due to mortgage foreclosure. Under a variation of the
basic social provision of capital described above, such owners would be
given the ability to remain in their home. Federal funds would be used to
retire the debt (over time or all at once), and the home would forever
remain debt-free, for permanent use by other income-eligible households
whenever the existing residents departed. Such an arrangement should
be expanded to allow any low- or moderate-income homeowner, regard-
less of her mortgage delinquency or foreclosure status, to engineer such a
conversion, in effect trading the possibility of profiting from eventual re-
sale of the home for security of tenure and drastically reduced monthly
housing costs.
(c) Transferring ownership of buildings to nonprofit entities and
providing the operators with sufficient subsidies to repair and continuously
maintain the units, while permitting the residents to pay no more than an
affordable portion of their income. The largest single group of families
with housing problems, including substandard housing, overcrowding,
and unaffordable housing costs, are lower-income renters. In 1989, fifty-
six percent of all poor renters paid at least half of their income for rent.34
The combination of long-term undermaintenance, profit-maximizing be-
havior by landlords, rising costs of operation (property taxes, utilities,
insurance, and repairs), and low tenant incomes offers little hope for im-
provement absent radical measures. Thus, a major element of a compre-
hensive program to attain the National Housing Goal involves giving
nonprofit entities control over low-income housing units.
C. A commitment to provide sufficient government subsidies to close
the gap between income and housing costs, as long as there are
people with incomes insufficient to meet existing market costs of
housing
Such reforms are ambitious and problematic, which emphasizes why
the housing problem largely has been avoided in most discussions of anti-
poverty strategies. The costs of such a program will depend in part on
how rapidly it is implemented and which parts are implemented first, as
some are inherently more expensive than others. The first-year cost esti-
34. LEONARD & LAZERE, supra note 3, at 6.
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mates of this comprehensive program, as put forward by -the Institute for
Policy Studies' Working Group on Housing, ranged from $29.5 billion a
year to $87.8 billion a year; the medium cost figure was $54.9 billion.3"
That figure is several times what the federal government now spends on
low-income housing subsidies. But the largest federal housing subsidy of
all-the homeowner tax deduction-is now some $55 billion a year; that
indirect subsidy goes primarily to middle- and upper-income taxpayers.36
Politically, however, the homeowner deduction is virtually untouchable,
and, as the only federal entitlement program in the housing area, it often
is regarded as a matter of right and not a subsidy at all. The political
difference between providing benefits to individuals by allowing them to
pay lower taxes and keep more of their income for personal consumption,
and providing direct consumption assistance via money raised through
the tax system, seems weighty.
The medium-level cost figure noted above would provide a massive
influx of housing benefits compared with recent and current levels. Six
and a half million households alone would be aided by a system of oper-
ating subsidies for housing in the social sector; another one and a half
million households would receive benefits from other elements of the pro-
gram such as construction of new social housing units, conversion of
homeownership units to social ownership in exchange for debt relief,
conversion to social ownership and modernization of existing privately
owned subsidized units, and conversion to social ownership and rehabili-
tation of existing privately owned non-subsidized units.
V. CONCLUSION
Will the nation adopt this or a similar program? Will we spend the
tens of billions of dollars needed to meet the National Housing Goal? It
would be foolish to offer a positive, or even mildly optimistic, answer
given current political and fiscal realities. The federal deficit dominates
all discussions of domestic spending programs. During the Reagan-Bush
years, the figure quadrupled, from $735 billion in January 1981 to the
current $3 trillion-plus figure.37 The $199 billion annual interest cost on
this debt "now exceeds the total of all Federal spending for education,
35. INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, supra note 26, at 63. These figures are in 1989
dollars, the year the IPS report was published. The report estimated costs at three levels,
depending on the mix of different program elements and the rapidity of progress in meeting the
National Housing Goal.
36. CUSHING DOLBEARE, AT A SNAIL'S PACE: FY 1993 (1992). Some 70% of total
homeowner deduction benefits go to people with incomes in the top 20th percentile.
37. Robert Pear, Growing U.S. Debt Is Limiting Options Open for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 1993, at 1.
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science, law enforcement, transportation, housing, food stamps, and
welfare."38
Given the conservative nature of President Clinton's appointments
in the economics area and the general public sentiment favoring deficit-
cutting, resisting tax hikes, and emphasizing help for the middle class-
with corresponding relative silence on the needs of the poor and minori-
ties-it is highly unlikely that there will be any substantial housing pro-
gram or increased expenditures in the next few years. And it is even less
likely that the major structural reforms in the U.S. housing system
needed to ensure attainment of the National Housing Goal will be car-
ried out. Nevertheless, it is important and useful to report the unvar-
nished truth about the magnitude and dimensions of the nation's housing
needs, the impossibility of meeting those needs without vastly increased
government subsidies, and the limitations of even major increases in
commitment without a corresponding restructuring of the way in which
housing is financed, developed, owned, and managed in the United
States.
38. Id.
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